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DATA DEVOLUTION: CORPORATE INFORMATION SECURITY,
CONSUMERS, AND THE FUTURE OF REGULATION
ANDREA M. MATWYSHYN
INTRODUCTION
Information crime is big business. Identity theft is the fastest growing
white-collar crime in the United States,' and in 2005, for the third year in a
row, it was also the most frequent consumer complaint to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). According to the FTC, identity theft costs consumers
and corporations $50 billion a year.3 Meanwhile, the exploits of organized
information crime are progressively more successful, running armies of
remotely controlled computers4 that allow criminals to attack critical
infrastructure targets, such as city power grids.5
As these facts indicate, the urgency of addressing the social policy
problems arising out of weak information security is clear. The essays in
this symposium examine the social policy concerns associated with data
vulnerability on three levels of social ecology: governments, markets and
* Andrea M. Matwyshyn is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the
Wharton School of University of Pennsylvania. This symposium arose subsequent to the Data
Devolution: Corporate Information Security and the Future of Regulation conference held at the
University of Florida Levin College of Law in January 2006. The author wishes to thank the Carol and
Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School at the University of
Pennsylvania for research funding support in connection with this symposium.
1. The white-collar crime characterization of identity inadequately reflects the increasing role of
organized crime and computer intrusion as integral components in the criminal infrastructure. As such,
identity theft is more aptly described as "black-collar crime," combining the financial incentives of
white-collar crime with the technological skills of black-hat hackers that-organized crime employs.
2. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Top 10 Consumer Fraud Complaint Categories,
FTC.coM, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/topten.htm.
3. FED. TRADE COMM'N, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf. The FTC estimates that in 2002, U.S. corporations have lost $48 billion
to identity theft. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in U.S. 27.3 Million
Victims in Past 5 Years, Billions in Losses for Businesses and Consumers, FTC.COM, Sept. 3, 2003,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/idthefthtm.
4. Zombie drones are machines with compromised security that can be controlled remotely
without the user's knowledge for malicious purposes, such as to send spam. See, e.g., Primer: Zombie
Drone, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A304-
2004Jan31.html; Thomas M. Dailey, Chair and President U.S. Internet Service Providers Ass'n, Gen.
Counsel, Verizon Online, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census (June 16, 2004).
5. See, e.g., Tom, Espiner, CIA: Cyberattack Caused Multiple-City Blackout, CNET NEWS, Jan.
22, 2008, http://www.news.com/2100-7349_3-6227090.html.
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businesses, and individuals.
I. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM: INFORMATION SECURITY IN SOCIAL
CONTEXT
Although a regulatory approach is the likely solution to a portion of
the information vulnerability problems we face, government is
simultaneously a core part of the vulnerability problem. Governments face
a formidable challenge from information crime and the burgeoning
criminal black market in stolen data. In particular, data vulnerability on the
government level jeopardizes the efficacy of social systems that rely on
tight information control. With compromised access controls on
government-held data, it becomes impossible to accurately identify
individuals using the data in these government databases. Yet, systems
such as the social security system continue to rely upon them.
Despite the fact that government databases are attractive targets for
information criminals, federal agencies have repeatedly failed cyber
security reviews performed by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and the improvements instituted in response to the GAO warnings
of security inadequacy appear to have been largely ineffectual. For
example, between 2000 and 2005, the Veteran's Administration (VA)
received a failing grade from the GAO cyber security review four out of
five times. 6 In 2006, the VA suffered a leakage of 26.5 million veterans'
health records.7 That same year, an offshore subcontractor allegedly tried to
extract payment for its services to the agency by threatening to post tens of
thousands of veterans' health records that it had access to on the Internet.8
Information vulnerability also places businesses at risk, risk not only
of criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits for data breaches, but also
potential losses of key corporate assets. Although databases of aggregated
consumer information may be the most valuable assets for a business, their
value is heavily contingent upon limited access. For example, data breaches
at information intermediaries, such as ChoicePoint and Acxiom,10
6. See, e.g., Grant Gross, VA Ignores Cybersecurity Warnings, PCWORLD, June 14, 2006,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 126093-page,1/article.html.
7. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Theft of Veterans' ID Data, MSNBC, May 22, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12916803/.
8. See, e.g., Mary Mosquera, Subcontractor Put VA Health Records at Risk: IG, GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERNEWS, June 14,2006, http://www.gcn.com/online/vollnol/41036-l.html.
9. In February 2005, Choicepoint suffered a data breach that exposed 145,000 consumers to
possible identity theft. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, ID Theft Victims Could Lose Twice, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2005,
hutp://www.wired.com/news/politics/privacy/1,66685-0.html.
10. See, e.g., John Leyden, Acxiom Database Hacker Jailed for 8 years, REGISTER, Feb. 23, 2006,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/23/acxiomspamhack-sentencing!.
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necessarily decrease the value of those databases because value is tied to
restricted access. Additionally, weak information security practices may
lead to loss of corporate trade secrets and negative publicity.
Further, consumer harm occurs. Information vulnerability, information
leakage, and identity theft result in individual consumers' loss of control
over their economic identities. Fifteen years ago, the technology revolution
shifted power from the center to the periphery. 11 Now, technology-
mediated information aggregation is usurping power back for the center,
taking it away from private database owners and consumers, and,
sometimes unintentionally, concentrating it in the hands of information
criminals. Economic and nonpecuniary harm frequently results from the
aggregation and impudent sharing of personal economic histories. A stolen
identity, for example, may limit the victim's economic participation in the
society for several years.
Unfortunately, without regulatory intervention it is likely that
information security will continue to deteriorate on all three levels of social
ecology. As more consumers rely on technology-mediated exchange for
their daily activities, the incentives for information criminals to engage in
information crime rise. An arms race is currently under way between
information criminals and technologists, with computer code serving as
both a sword and a shield to control information. Progress, if any, is a game
of "Whack a Mole" with even major technology companies, such as
Microsoft, stating that a regulatory intervention is necessary. 12 Borrowing
the words of Lewis Carroll, our society is experiencing an information
security "Red Queen Effect," a situation similar to one where Alice tells the
Red Queen that she needs to run simply to stay in the same place and needs
to run twice as fast to advance. 13 Thus, as the arms race continues between
information criminals and information security professionals, consumers,
like Alice, are forced to adjust quickly to the escalating information crime
threats simply in order to survive.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
The legal information security regime in the United States is a
patchwork of federal and state laws. The federal regulatory approach is
segmented by the type of collected and stored data. For example, the
11. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION xiii (1999).
12. See Microsoft Advocates Comprehensive Federal Privacy Legislation, MICROSOFT, Nov. 3,
2005, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/nov05/1 1-03DataPrivacyPR.mspx.
13. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
(1872).
2010]
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulates health data,
while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regulates financial data, and the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act regulates children's data. Most
states have also recently passed data breach notification laws that require
entities to report data leaks to impacted consumers.
Although federal and local state statutes have been in place for several
years, they have had limited success. Their efficacy remains in doubt as the
problem of identity theft escalates, and the number of data breaches
increases. Therefore, a thoughtful reevaluation of the United States
domestic regulatory direction in the area of consumer protection is
warranted.
A. Information Security Obligations under Federal Law
1. Information Security Obligations under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act
In the area of health data privacy, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) sets minimum levels of data care and
security with regard to collection, storage, and sharing of personally
identifiable health information.14 Specifically, HIPAA requires that entities
that handle personally identifiable health information give notice of their
privacy practices and ensure privacy and security of information.' 5 HIPAA
includes privacy rules and security rules. 16 HIPAA privacy rules require
that responsibility for privacy within each organization be centralized in the
hands of a Chief Privacy Officer.17 Security rules mandate that entities
covered by HIPAA implement administrative, physical, and technical
•18 •• 19
safeguards against data breaches. Finally, both privacy and securityrules mandate disclosure of privacy and security practices to consumers
14. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); see U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
(HIPAA) (2004), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fshipaa.pdf. For a discussion of HIPAA, see Peter P.
Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The Health Care Example, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2002).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2008).
16. Id. §§ 164.302-.534.
17. Entities must designate a privacy official who is responsible for developing and implementing
the entities' privacy policies and procedures and a contact person or officer who is responsible for
receiving complaints. Id. § 164.530(a). Many companies that do not handle health information have
also begun to designate officer level privacy positions. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, KEY
REGIONAL HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 1 (2008),
18. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, How HIPAA AND
SECURITY INTERSECT: REPORTING ON REQUEST 4-5 (2003).
19. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), .504(e).
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and require that each contract with a third party provider includes an
information security warranty on the part of the provider to maintain
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of health data that the provider
receives.
But the enforcement of HIPAA rules has been weak in the past.
During a conference on HIPAA privacy rules, Richard M. Campanelli, then
Director of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Office of Civil Rights stated that HHS would not be aggressive in
punishing healthcare organizations that violate HIPAA. Campanelli
indicated that voluntary compliance was the most effective way to
implement data security, and voluntary compliance would be achieved by
the public complaining directly to healthcare organizations about any• ~21 . .
privacy breaches. This spirit of non-enforcement appears to continue with
few actions brought to date.
22
2. Information Security Obligations under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act), governs the handling of data by financial
institutions. The GLB Act requires that financial institutions provide
notice of their privacy practices, exercise care in handling data, and allow
20. Id. pts. 160, 162, 164.
21. Christine Wiebe, Medical Privacy Protections Still Unevent, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS,
May 19, 2003, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/455834-print. Meanwhile, privacy breaches of
health records are becoming frequent. For example, in November 2003, an automated probe accessed a
computer at Indiana University's Center for Sleep Disorders, compromising 7,000 patients' data. Id.
Similarly, about 1.4 million files containing the personal data of patients may have been stolen from the
University of California, Berkeley during a recent security breach. See Clea Benson, Computer Data on
Home Care Breached, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/
medical/story/I 1152364p-12068658c.html.
Additionally, foreign companies to which domestic organizations have outsourced work with
patient data have threatened to publish the patient records on the Internet unless the domestic entity paid
a "ransom" to prevent such disclosure. See Dr. Richard Bassett et. al., Security Risks Associated with
Geosourcing, INFO. SYS. SEC. ASS'N J., Sept. 2004, at 22-28. But the first criminal prosecution under
HIPAA was settled in August 2004 in an egregious case of patient information theft by an insider who
used patient data to obtain credit cards. Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Gibson, No. 04-0374, 2004 WL
2237585 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004).
22. Two defendants were convicted of theft of identity information from the Cleveland Clinic for
purposes of identity theft and in violation of HIPAA. See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation Miami
Div., Two Defendants Sentenced in Health Care Fraud, HIPAA, and Identity Theft Conspiracy,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 3, 2007, http://miami.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/ mm20070503.htm.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006). The GLB Act uses the term "financial institutions" to refer to
entities that offer financial products or services, such as loans, financial or investment advice, or
insurance, to individuals; "financial institutions" include non-bank mortgage lenders, loan brokers,
some financial or investment advisers, tax preparers, real estate settlement services providers, and debt
collectors. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/ business/idtheft/bus53.pdf (last visited Dec. 22,
2009).
2010]
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consumers to opt out of data sharing and to prohibit use of their private
financial information in ways they did not authorize. 24 The GLB Act also
requires that contracts between financial institutions and partners with
whom they share data prohibit the partners' use of customer information
for any purpose other than the initial information disclosure.
25
More than ten federal and state agencies are authorized to enforce
various provisions of the GLB Act, and several entities have been
prosecuted for violations of the statute. Further, not only does the GLB
Act define "financial institutions" broadly, but the FTC has also attempted
to expand the reach of the GLB Act to businesses that are not generally
considered "financial institutions" under the FTC.
27
3. Information Security Obligations Under the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which was
enacted in October 1998, requires that websites targeting children under the
age of thirteen provide notice of their privacy practices and obtain
verifiable parental consent before collecting data from children. 28 The
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6802.
25. 16 C.F.R. § 313.13.
26. The FTC prosecuted Superior Mortgage Corporation ("Superior Mortgage"), a lender with
forty branch offices in ten states operating multiple websites, for violating the GLB Act. Compl. 1 1, In
re Superior Mortgage Corp., No. C-4153 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Dec. 16, 2005). The FTC alleged that the
company, among other things, "failed to implement reasonable policies and procedures to protect the
security and confidentiality of the information it collect[ed]." Id. 5. More specifically, it alleged that
Superior Mortgage violated the GLB Act Safeguards Rule by failing to:
[(I)] assess risks to its customer information [in a timely manner]; [(2)] institute appropriate
password policies to control access to company systems and documents containing sensitive
customer information; [(3)] ... encrypt or otherwise protect sensitive customer information
[before emailing it]; [and (4)] ... ensure that its service providers were providing appropriate
security.
Id. 6. The FTC's encryption argument is noteworthy; it asserts that although the company encrypted
sensitive personal information when it was collected, it was decrypted and e-mailed in clear, readable
text once the information was received at the website. Id. The FTC concluded that it had reason to
believe that Superior Mortgage had violated the GLB Act and ordered Superior Mortgage to (1)
establish data security procedures subject to independent third-party auditor review for ten years; and
(2) not misrepresent the extent to which the company maintains and protects privacy, confidentiality, or
security of consumer personal information. See In re Superior Mortgage Corp., No. C-4153 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Dec. 14, 2005).
27. The FTC attempted and failed to extend the reach of the GLB Act to attorneys. See A.B.A. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 430 F.3d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Security obligations under the GLB Act
supplement the obligations that many "financial institutions" have under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
15 U.S.C. § 6806.
28. Id. §§ 6501-6502. For a discussion of COPPA, see, for example, Gaia Bernstein, When New
Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921,
927, n.19 (2005); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129, 133 (2005). Commentators
have observed that COPPA was a reaction to the failure of self-regulation, particularly subsequent to
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statute also empowers the FTC to promulgate additional regulations to
require website operators subject to COPPA to establish and "maintain
reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity
of personal information collected from children."' 29 According to the FTC,
appropriate security measures for protecting children's data include "using
secure web servers and firewalls; deleting personal information once it is
no longer being used; limiting employee access to data and providing those
employees with data-handling training; and carefully screening the third
parties to whom such information is disclosed."
30
But, COPPA leaves some data security to the discretion of individual
website operators and creates no external reporting mechanism to monitor
their internal security improvements. 31 Specifically, as mentioned above,
COPPA stipulates that a website "operator" must obtain "verifiable
parental consent" before collecting data from children under thirteen. 32 The
guidance offered on operationalization is limited. Although a fax from a
parent is the preferred method of parental consent verification per the
statute, email verification was permitted due to the cumbersome nature of
fax verifications. 33 However, the actual verifiability of these methods
warrants scrutiny.
The FTC applies a "sliding scale" approach to COPPA inquiries.
34
The FTC's analysis varies depending on the character of data collection
and intended use of the collected data because the need to obtain verifiable
parental consent does not apply equally to all child data gathering. For
example, for the FTC, a situation where a website collects data for a one-
time use without permanently connecting the child with the information
the KIDS.coM advisory letter where the FTC set forth standards for privacy policies on websites
targeting children. For a discussion of the KIDS.COM FTC letter, see Parry Aftab, How COPPA Came
About, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD= 17300888.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(l)(D).
30. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,906 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be
codified as 16 C.F.R. pt. 312). But these technology specifications are suboptimal. For example, servers
cannot be inherently "secure" or "vulnerable"; securing a server is an ongoing process. A better
regulation would require companies to take all steps that a leading security research firm has identified
as fundamental to the exercise of care in attempting to secure a server on an ongoing basis.
31. Id. Encryption was deemed to be potentially cost prohibitive and left to the discretion of
entities, as was the suggested use of contractual provisions that required that third parties follow
minimum standards of data handling if they had been granted access to the collected children's data. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (defining "operator" broadly to encompass everyone who meaningfully
handles children's data); Id. § 6502.
33. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (2005). Email verification was
original intended as a temporary measure, but its use has persisted over time. Still, email verification is
susceptible to even easier child circumvention than fax verification.
34. See BNA, FTC Decides to Retain COPPA Rule With No Change After Review of Comments, 7
COMP. TECH. L. REP. 127 (2006).
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does not legally require the same degree of consent verifiability as a
situation where a website establishes such permanent connection between
the child and the information. 35 Additionally, the FTC has permitted the
Children's Advertising Review Unit of the Better Business Bureau to serve
as a safe harbor program to review and warrant websites' compliance with
COPPA.
36
The FTC has authority to institute regulatory prosecutions against
entities violating COPPA. These prosecutions result in fines and consent
decrees. The fines range from $130,000 against Industrious Kid, Inc.37 to,
as of recently, $1,000,000 against Xanga.com, Inc. 3 8 Generally, however,
they do not exceed $500,000. 39 Further, as of 2009, only fifteen entities
appear to have been prosecuted according to the FTC since the enactment
of COPPA.
40
For these and other reasons, COPPA has received mixed reviews. The
deterrent effect of prosecutions appears to be limited. A large number of
websites subject to COPPA are noncompliant and willing to risk
prosecution instead of attempting to comply with COPPA: several studies
indicate that less than only 70% of the reviewed websites attempt to
comply with COPPA.4 1 Businesses have complained that the estimated
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 6503(2). In particular, one of the COPPA exceptions provides for one time
collection, provided the information is subsequently destroyed. Id. § 6503(2)(A). In practice, companies
frequently use these exceptions to the extent possible to avoid compliance. Id.
36. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm'n to Children's Advertising
Review Unit, Jan. 26, 2001, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/caruletter.pdf.
37. See Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief, U.S. v.
Industrious Kid, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00639 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2008).
38. See Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief, U.S. v.
Xanga.com, Inc., No. 06-CIV-6853(SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006). On September 11, 2006, the FTC
and Xanga.com, Inc. settled a regulatory action where the FTC alleged that Xanga.com: (1) failed to
notify parents and obtain consent before collecting, using, and disclosing the information of children it
knew to be under thirteen; (2) allowed children under thirteen to register using a birth date showing that
they were under thirteen, contrary to the user agreement; (3) failed to implement measures to prevent
collection of the children's personal information after it allegedly knew of their age-specific registration;
and (4) failed to notify the children's parents of the company's information practices or provide them
with access to and control over the information collected on their children. Id., Compl. IM 16-30, U.S.
v. Xanga, No. 06 Civ. 6853 (SHS) (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006).
39. See, e.g., Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, and Other Relief, U.S. v.
Bonzi Software, Inc., No. CV-04-1048 RJK (C.D. Cal. March. 09, 2004); Consent Decree & Order for
Civil Penalties, Injunctive, and Other Relief, U.S. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. CV-04-1050 JFW
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2004); Consent Decree & Order for Civil Penalties, Injunctive, and Other Relief,
U.S. v. Hershey Foods Corp., No. 4:03-CV-00350 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2003).
40. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Privacy Initiatives, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/
childrens_enf.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
41. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, PRIVACY POLICIES ON CHILDREN'S WEBSITES: Do THEY PLAY BY
THE RULES? 12 (2001). Two studies of COPPA compliance by the University of Pennsylvania's
Annenberg Public Policy Center and by the Center for Media Education revealed that although most of
the reviewed websites had privacy policies, those privacy statements did not include the required
disclosures and used language that was difficult to understand. Id.
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annual cost of COPPA compliance through monitoring use of the website,
drafting privacy policies, and obtaining proof of parental consent is as
much as $200,000. 42 In some cases, companies have deemed the costs of
compliance prohibitive and simply ceased all or parts of their operations.
4 3
For example, some websites removed interactive elements from their sites
shortly after the enactment of COPPA, alleging that compliance costs
rendered those lines of business unsustainable.
But the biggest problem is, practically speaking, that COPPA protects
only the data of children who wish to have it protected.4 5 For example, a
COPPA-compliant website may require a child to enter a birth date, and, if
the child is under thirteen, initially deny such child access to the content.
46
But this age verification process is easy to circumvent: a child wishing to
access content after having been denied access may log into the website
again and provide a false birth date to gain access to the material.
47
B. Information Security Obligations under State Data Breach
Notification Laws
State data breach notification statutes are the newest and, arguably,
most effective approach to addressing data security issues.48 At least forty-
eight states have data security breach notification statutes that compel
entities that have suffered data breaches to provide written notice to the
consumers whose data has been impacted. 49 The legislative purpose of data
breach notification laws was to prevent identity theft and to generate a
modicum of external accountability for data care: legislators have aimed to
mitigate the effects of identity theft by requiring entities to notify
consumers of data compromised during a data breach. Alerting potential
victims to check their credit reports may help detect some instances of
identity theft early.50 Meanwhile, research indicates that consumers who
42. See Ben Chamy, The Cost of COPPA: Kids' Site Stops Talking, ZDNET, Sept. 13, 2000,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-523848.html.
43. Art Wolinsky, WiredKids: From Safety and Privacy to Literacy and Empowerment,
WIREDKIDS, Sept. 2000, http://www.infotoday.com/mmschools/sep00/wolinsky.htm.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., A Kid's Privacy Experiment, NET FAMILY NEWS (2000), http://www.netfamilynews.
org/n 100041 .html.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. For a discussion of state data breach notification statutes see, for example, Paul M. Schwartz,
Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REv. 913, 915 (2007).
49. For a list of state data breach notification statutes, see Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
State Security Breach Notification Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
50. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Identity Theft Victims: Immediate Steps, http://www.consumer.gov/
2010]
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take notice of data breach notifications increasingly view information
holders as having an obligation of data stewardship to them.51 But
consumers may also feel powerless to protect themselves against the
mishandling of their data and, therefore, develop "notification fatigue" as
they receive numerous security notices describing past breaches.
52
There are significant differences among state data breach notification
laws. For example, state statutes vary in the types of data that they cover: in
California, breach of medical data triggers the statutory disclosure
obligation,53 while other states exempt encrypted data from the types of
information that trigger the notice requirement, with the definition of
encrypted data further varying among states. The states also define
"breach" differently, oftentimes allowing an entity that has suffered a data-
compromising incident to determine whether it has to give notice to the
consumers. There are also significant variations in the statutory timeframes
for reports of security breaches, with some statutes allowing as much as ten
days or longer to report a breach after the company discovers it.54 But the
discovery of a breach may occur months or years after the initial
communication with an individual.55 Finally, the party that must give
notice varies, depending on the state statute. Most, but not all, of the
statutes cover only for-profit entities, and prosecutions have been limited.
56
C. Information Security Obligations under Securities Law and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Securities law provides another source of information security
idtheft/consteps.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
51. Andy Greenberg, If Security Is Expensive, Try Getting Hacked, FORBES.COM, Nov. 28, 2007,
http://www.forbes.con/home/technology/2007/11/27/data-privacy-hacking-tech-security-cxag. 128
databreach.html.
52. See, e.g., Grant Gross Analysis: US Data Breach Notification Law Unlikely This Year,
MACWORLD, May 8, 2006, http://www.macworld.com/article/50709/2006/05/databreach.html
(discussing the possibility of national data breach notification legislation).
53. Deborah Gage, Notfication Law to Now Cover Medical Data; State Residents Must be Told If
Records Breached, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f- /c/a/2008/
01/04/BUR6U900O.DTL.
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2008).
55. The University of California, Los Angeles, suffered breaches of data of applicants from the
previous ten years. See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, UCLA Admits Massive Data Hack, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.informationweek.com/security/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=196603485.
56. One of the prosecutions involved a claims management company, CS Stars LLC ("CS Stars").
SANS Institute, NY AG Settles Data Breach Case with Chicago Company, SANS NEWSBITES, Apr. 27,
2007, http://www.itcinstitute.org/display.aspx?id=3474. The New York Attorney General's alleged that
CS Stars violated New York's Information Security Breach and Notification law because it waited two
months after discovering that a computer containing personnel records was missing to notify 540,000
individuals about the breach. Id. The AG reached a settlement agreement with the company, which had
to pay $60,000 for the AG investigation costs. Id.
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obligations for publicly traded companies. Business norms disclosed in
securities filings shape, in part, the standards of reasonable behavior in the
area of information security.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations may already
(and should explicitly) require discussions of security practices and data
breaches as part of securities filings. For example, Item 103 of Regulation
S-K ("Item 103"), requires entities to disclose "material pending legal
proceedings other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the
business." Prudent companies should disclose pending information
security litigation, particularly involving possible information security
harms. Such litigation frequently involves class action suits, which may
result in large damage awards against the company and generate bad
publicity; companies should not deem such lawsuits to be "ordinary routine
litigation" exempt from disclosure.
Item 308 of Regulation S-K ("Item 308") requires management to
report on internal controls over financial reporting. 58 More specifically,
Item308(a)(2) requires a statement identifying the framework that
management uses to evaluate the effectiveness of the company's internal
controls. 59 The SEC should ensure that companies disclose information
security audits, such as SAS 70 audits, as part of this statement. 6 1 Under
Item 308, a company must also provide an attestation report of a registered
public accounting firm on the internal controls over financial reporting.
6 2
Further, Item 308(a)(3) requires management to disclose material
weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, which may include
serious information security breaches. 63 If an entity experiences repeated
data vulnerabilities, particularly serious intrusions by third parties into
information systems, it is possible that the integrity of the entity's financial
auditing processes has been corrupted. Under such circumstances,
attestation of integrity may be improper. 64 Similarly, both the SEC and an
entity must consider the extent of the diminished value of compromised
data and its impact on the value of intangible assets reported in the
financial statements.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2008).
58. Id. § 229.308.
59. Id. § 229.308(a)(2).
60. SAS 70 audits pertain to an in-depth audit of a service organization's control activities, which
generally include an inspection of controls over information technology and other security processes.
See SAS 70 Overview, http://www.sas70.com/about.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
61. 17 C.F.R § 229.308(a)(2).
62. Id. § 229.308(b).
63. Id. § 229.308(a)(3).
64. Id. § 229.308(b).
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Form 10-K, an annual report, requires that public entities disclose all
"material" events related to the business that may impact a shareholder's
investment in the entity. 65 The goal of the Management Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations ("MD&A")-
one of the central requirements of the annual report-is to enable investors
to analyze the management's view of the corporation's financial health,
culture, goals, and identity. 66 Therefore, this section is intended to require a
discussion of trends, unusual or important events, and corporate risks that
are reasonably likely to materially impact the company through the eyes of
management. Although the definition of materiality is in flux and grants
the corporation discretion in identifying "material" events,6 8 the SEC
should consider the risks of information security breaches. Particularly
those breaches that involve data-intensive enterprises should be deemedS 69
material, and, therefore, subject to the disclosure requirements. Therefore,
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2)(2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.303, .310.
66. Id. § 229.303; Release No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989) ("The MD&A requirements are intended
to provide, in one section of a filing, material historical and prospective textual disclosure enabling
investors and other users to assess the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant,
with particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future."). The MD&A "shall provide
information as specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this Item and also shall provide such other
information that the registrant believes to be necessary to an understanding of its financial condition,
changes in financial condition and results of operations." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; see also Commission
Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, SEC Release No. 33-8350 (Dec. 29, 2003) (emphasizing that MD&A requires both analysis
and discussion, and should not simply be a restatement of the financial statement in narrative form nor
an otherwise uninformative series of technical responses to MD&A requirements). Further:
The Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation of the financial
statements, because a numerical presentation and brief accompanying footnotes alone may be
insufficient for an investor to judge the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past
performance is indicative of future performance. MD&A is intended to give the investor an
opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management by providing both a short
and long-term analysis of the business of the company. The Item asks management to discuss
the dynamics of the business and to analyze the financials.
Concept Release on Managements Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Operations, SEC
Release No. 33-6711 (Apr. 24, 1987).
67. Item 303(a)(3) requires disclosure of "known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the
registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact" on future income.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
68. For a discussion of materiality see, for example, Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive
Concept of "Materiality" Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663-64
(2004); Hugh Beck, Determining the Materiality of Earnings Forecasts Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act in Helwig v. Vencor, 2002 BYU L. REv. 111, 112-13.
69. Courts have defined materiality differently in different contexts of securities law. In some
instances, courts apply a "probability-magnitude" test. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
239 (1988). Under this test, materiality depends on whether the magnitude of the potential loss is so
great that even a remote risk requires disclosure or provides basis for actions for fraud under Section
l0b-5. See, e.g., Secs. & Exch. Comm'n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 849, 867 (2nd Cir. 1968).
In 1988, the SEC adopted this standard of materiality for MD&A disclosures. See Fed. Sec. Law Rep.
Rel. No. 25951, 62,125, 62,126 (1988). But in 1989, the SEC explained that the MD&A materiality
standards differed from those adopted in Texas GulfSulpher, 401 F.2d at 849. The SEC instructed
management to make two assessments to determine materiality: (1) assess whether a particular trend,
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good corporate practice should include discussions of information security
strategy, diligence in monitoring, policies, and enforcement habits in the
annual report. The MD&A disclosures also complement "risk factor"
disclosure in registration statements under the 1933 Securities Act and
increasingly form an integral part of periodic reporting under the 1934
Exchange Act. Additionally, the MD&A disclosures create a public record
of diligence in addressing information security that may prove useful in
litigation after a security breach.
The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act
of 2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX"), 70 and the new
rules promulgated under SOX enlarged the scope of the discussion required
in MD&A. 7 1 Section 404 of SOX ("Section 404") addresses the accuracy
of audit processes and the security of corporate information of publicly
event, or uncertainty is reasonably likely to happen; and (2) if management cannot determine the
likelihood of such occurrence, it must evaluate the contingency on the assumption that it will happen.
Management's Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operations; Certain
Investment Company Disclosure, SEC Release No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989). A different definition of
materiality appears in insider trading contexts. Information is material for purposes of creating the basis
of an insider trading action if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important" in deciding how to act. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
70. Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-
7266 (2006).
71. SEC pronouncements on MD&A and qualitative disclosure have included the following: in
1980, the SEC adopted present disclosure requirements for MD&A; Amendments to Annual Report
Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and Guides, SEC Release 33-6231 (Sept. 2, 1980). In 1981,
the SEC issued staff interpretive guidance for MD&A; Management's Discussion & Analysis of
Financial Condition & Results of Operations, SEC Release 33-6349 (Sept. 28, 1981). In 1987, the SEC
commented on the adequacy of MD&A and on proposed revisions; Concept Release on Managements
Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Operations, SEC Release 33-6711 (Apr. 17, 1987). In
1989, the SEC issued a staff interpretive release on MD&A, Management's Discussion & Analysis of
Financial Condition & Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosure, SEC Release
33-6835 (May 18, 1989). In the Segment Reporting, SEC Release No. 33-7620 (Jan. 5, 1999), the SEC
adopted technical amendments to conform the reporting requirements with FAS No. 131, so that
narrative disclosure in reports had to relate to each operating segment when segment financial reporting
was required. In 2001, the SEC discussed a review of Fortune 500 annual reports results in comment
letters, many of which commented on MD&A to more than 350 of these companies. Action: Cautionary
Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, SEC Release 33-8040 (Dec. 12,
2001). In 2002, cautionary advice was issued encouraging companies to include in MD&A full
explanations of their "critical accounting policies." Commission Statement about Management's
Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operations, SEC Release 33-8056 (Jan. 22,
2002). That same year, the SEC proposed additional MD&A disclosure requirements for critical
accounting estimates. Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Managements Discussion & Analysis about the
Application of Critical Accounting Policies, SEC Release 33-8098 (May 10, 2002). In 2003, additional
MD&A disclosure requirements were adopted for off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual
obligations, Final Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion & Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements & Aggregate Contractual Obligation, SEC Release 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003); and the SEC
issued guidance on MD&A, Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion
& Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operations, SEC Release 33-8350 (Dec. 29, 2003).
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•. 72
traded entities. It requires that entities establish adequate internal controls
and auditing procedures7 3  certified by management 74  regarding the
financial statements of the entity.75 Consequently, SOX addresses
information security in two ways. First, entities must establish information
security processes and audit procedures to protect against information
vulnerability. Second, entities must accurately reflect the diminished value
of any intangible assets compromised by information security breaches on
their financial statements. In other words, information regarding the value
of intangible assets, which includes both consumer information and
corporate trade secret information, must be accurately reported. Similar to
the requirement under Item 308 of Regulation S-K, if the data has been
compromised, the reported value must reflect this negative change in
value.
76
D. Information Security Obligations under the Federal Trade
Commission Act and state law
Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC authority to examine entities'
"unfair or deceptive" information practices.7 7 The FTC has interpreted
Section 5 of the FTC Act to mean that a representation, omission, or
practice is "deceptive" if it is likely to (1) mislead consumers and (2t
impact consumers' decisions about a particular product or service.
According to the FTC, an act or practice is "unfair" under the FTC Act if
an injury that results or is likely to result is (1) substantial, (2) not
outweighed by other benefits; and (3) not reasonably avoidable. 79 The FTC
has already relied on these definitions to bring action against companies
that have experienced data breaches, particularly when no other data
72. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
73. For example, one auditing procedure that specifically relates to information security is a SAS
70 audit. See SAS 70 Overview, http://www.sas70.com/about.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
74. Section 302 of SOX requires the SEC to promulgate rules regarding officers' responsibility to
certify the accuracy of financial statements and auditing procedures. See Final Rule, Certification of
Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Certification of Disclosure in Companies'
Quarterly & Annual Reports, SEC Release Nos. 33-8124 (Aug. 29, 2002).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
76. Because Section 302 of SOX specifically authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules regarding
officers' responsibility to certify the accuracy of financial statements and auditing process, the SEC is
authorized to promulgate rules specific to information security reporting and certification in connection
with Section 404 of SOX. Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7241.
77. Id. § 45.
78. See id. § 6502 (making it unlawful for a website to misrepresent why it is collecting children's
personal identifying information without clearly and prominently disclosing the additional data use).
79. Compl. 10, Fed. Trade Comm'n, DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges, Dec. 1, 2005,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/l2/dsw.htm
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security statute governs the leakage of data.8 0 Thus, a business's data
security practices may trigger scrutiny not only under specific data privacy
statutes, but also under the general FTC Act.
In addition to the FTC Act, many states have consumer fraud laws,
known as the "Little FTC Acts," that often authorize private citizens to
recover damages and attorney fees for loss resulting from the merchant's
deceptive practice. The remedies under state and local consumer fraud laws
are often stronger than those under similar federal statutes; they also apply
to more seller practices than do federal laws.
8 2
80. For example, in 2006, the FTC charged DSW Shoe Warehouse (DSW) with committing unfair
act practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Compl. 11, Fed. Trade Comm'n, DSW Inc.
Settles FTC Charges, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.htn-L More specifically, the
FTC alleged that DSW:
[(I)] created unnecessary risks to sensitive information by storing it in multiple files when it
no longer had a business need to keep the information; [(2)] failed to use readily available
security measures to limit access to its computer networks through wireless access points on
the networks; [(3)] stored the information in unencrypted files that could be easily accessed
using a commonly known user ID and password; [(4)] failed to limit sufficiently the ability of
computers on one in-store network to connect to computers on other in-store and corporate
networks; and [(5)] failed to employ sufficient measures to detect unauthorized access.
Id.
81. Marketing is the most data intensive portion of business operations where issues of deceptive
or unfair practices arise. Consequently, data security risks related to consumer data may be at their
greatest in connection with marketing uses. In addition to the FTC Act concerns, businesses may face
liability under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act ("CAN-
SPAM Act"), which became effective on January 1, 2004. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006). The CAN-
SPAM Act makes it unlawful to send messages with materially false or misleading header information,
which includes the subject, and prohibits address harvesting and dictionary attacks. Id. § 7704(a). It also
requires that spari email provide an option to opt out of future mailings, that such opt-out requests be
honored, and that sexually explicit materials be clearly labeled as such. Id. § 7704(a)(5), (d). Businesses
that are not sufficiently careful in complying with individual consumer requests and controlling their
data may face suit from the FTC, state regulators, or ISPs on behalf of consumers. Id. § 7706. Although
the CAN-SPAM Act creates private right of action for the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), it preempts
most state anti-spam statutes. Id. As such, it takes away the private right of action that non-IPS
businesses and consumers had against spammers under state anti-spam statutes against spammers.
82. For a discussion of the little FTC Acts, see, for example, MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2008 ed.). Outside of the little FTC Acts governing data security related to
marketing practices, state statutes, which included provisions addressing matters not specifically
contemplated by the Act, may provide recourse for parties impacted by spain, although the CAN-SPAM
Act preempted a majority of state spam statutes. Therefore, recourse and potential liability for sending
unsolicited commercial email pertains on the state level only in selected states. As of December 2003,
immediately before the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect, thirty-one states had laws regulating the
transmission of spam. None of these statutes contained an outright ban on spam, but they (1) restricted
either the categories of recipients of spain to those with a preexisting relationship with the sender or to
those who otherwise affirmatively consented to spam email; or (2) required clear labeling through a
subject line containing the letters ADV or an opt-out method in the text of the spam to prevent the
future sending of spam to this recipient. Until recently, neither the state attorney generals, nor private
spam recipients brought action under these statutes. See e.g., Gillman v. Sprint Commc'ns, 91 P.3d 858,
859 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Verizon Online Servs, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 602, 604, (E.D.
Va. 2002); MonsterHut Inc. v. PaeTec Commc'ns, Inc., 294 A.D.2d 945, 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001);
State of Wash. v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 405 (Wash. 2001); Compl. 5-14, Microsoft Corporation v.
Does I through 50, No. 5:03-cv-00644 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2003); Compl. 1-4, Morrison & Foerster
v. Etracks.com, Inc, No. 404294 (CA. Supr. Ct. June 12, 2002). Courts have upheld the constitutionality
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Further, generally, under the basic principles of states' corporate law,
officers and directors of a corporation owe the shareholders three fiduciary
duties: the duty of care, loyalty and good faith. Arguably, corporate
disregard for data security raises an issue of breach of duties of care and
good faith, which, broadly speaking, require that directors and officers act
in good faith with the care of a prudent person in their decision making
process and in the best interest of the corporation. The issue becomes
whether the fiduciaries' data protection actions are in line with the exercise
of reasonable care in decision making that a prudent person would exercise
regarding the manner in which corporate information assets are acquired,
used and protected.
Particularly in data-intensive and intellectual property-intensive
enterprises, much corporate capital is allocated to research and
development of new intellectual property. This new intellectual property
can arise in three forms: traditional research and development projects
whose output will be protected through copyright, trademark or patent law;
top secret innovation protected solely by trade secret law and contracts; and
databases of consumer information, potentially protectable through either
method. Particularly for the corporate intangible assets that are best
protected through trade secret law, this legal protection depends on the
maintenance of confidentiality of the asset. Courts look to whether entities
have taken reasonable steps to preserve the secrecy of the asset to
determine whether trade secret protection should be extended. If an entity
has a history of security breaches, it is difficult to argue that an entity has
engaged in careful, systematic protection of its information assets.
Consequently, each security breach may jeopardize trade secret protection
for key corporate assets and, correspondingly, signal a possible inadequate
level of care on the part of corporate decision makers.
Because of statutory prescriptions regarding proper data handling in
connection with certain types of data, security breaches of consumer
information databases may result not only in prosecution by the FTC, the
state attorney general, and other agencies, but also in consumer class83
actions and severe losses of goodwill. Research demonstrates that in at
least some instances 19% of customers terminate their relationship with the
company after a data security breach, 40% consider terminating the
relationship, and approximately 5% hire attorneys for potential legal
of state anti-spain statutes on various grounds. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
436, 437, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (First Amendment grounds); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, 94 Cal. App. 4th
1255, 1257 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (dormant Commerce Clause grounds).
83. White & Case LLP, Data Security Breaches Impact Corporate Bottom Lines, Sept. 26, 2005,
htp://www.whitecase.com/news/detail.aspx?news=670.
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action.84 These numbers are significant particularly when one considers
that between twenty-three and fifty million people have received notices of
data breaches in 2005. 85 Because of the severity of potential negative
consequences an entity may suffer from a security breach, officers and
directors who choose to ignore correction of information security problems
within the entity may be deemed to breach their fiduciary duties. Their
failure to protect corporate assets may rise to the level of corporate conduct
not protected by the business judgment rule.
E. Contractual Information Security Obligations
In addition to the statutory obligations discussed above, contract law is
the primary source of data security obligations. Contractual obligations, as
memorialized in connection with particular data exchanges, become a
source of both potential leverage and liability.
The statutes noted previously require data security representations and
warranties for transfers of certain types of data between business partners,
such as for the transfers of financial data under the GLB Act. 86 But, even in
data sharing situations not covered by statutes, prudent counsel should draft
contract provisions specifically addressing the standards of sharing, storing,
using, transferring and deleting data, handling security audits and data
security breaches, and allocating expenses associated with data breaches.
The contract should also provide a roadmap for delineation of data security
responsibilities. These types of provisions offer a method of risk
management, forming a written record that may be useful when assigning
responsibility after a data breach.
With respect to consumers, privacy policies are the most prevalent
data security contracts. The FTC enforces these policies as contracts bY
bringing action for unfair or deceptive practices for their breaches.
Similarly to the FTC, courts tend to analyze privacy policies as contracts,
with data security obligations surviving even in bankruptcy.
88
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
87. See In re Superior Mortgage Corporation, Docket C-4153, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523136/051216comp0523136.pdf (last visited December 20, 2009).
Superior Mortgage Corp., No. C-4153 (Fed. Trade Comm'n. Dec. 14, 2005).
88. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Toysmartcom, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass. filed June
9, 2000).
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F. Common Law Information Security Obligations
Information security common law, particularly involving claims of
negligent handling of data, has begun to emerge; as a practical matter data
security statutes cover relatively few categories of data and leave many
data care obligations to the discretion of corporate actors. Claims of data
security negligence in various contexts have survived summary judgment,
and the frequency of such claims has continued to increase. The
development of the common law of information security negligence claims
may eventually result in clear legal construction of "reasonable" security
practices, "reasonable" corporate conduct in contracting, and "reasonable"
users. 90 However, additional regulatory approaches will also be needed.
One of the recent cases involving allegations of information security
negligence arose out of a security breach of TJX Companies, Inc.
("TJX").91 In 2005, computer hackers obtained at least 45.7 million credit
and debit card numbers from TJX's database. 92 At the time of the breach,
TJX's wireless network was protected with WEP, an obsolete form of
encryption that was less secure than the encryption mechanism used on
many home wireless networks. 93 TJX's estimated direct monetary losses
from the incident were between $1.35 billion and $4.5 billion.94
Numerous lawsuits alleging negligence in information security and
89. See. e.g., Foster v. Hillcrest Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 10-02-143-CV, 2004 WL 254713, at *1, *5
(Tex. App. Feb. 11, 2004) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the medical center
formulated reasonable safeguards to prevent disclosure of medical records by an employee, and whether
it adequately enforced its information security policies before dismissing negligence claims);
Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that ERIS did
not preempt the negligence claim relating to the release of employee health data in connection with
benefits plan administration); Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Co., Inc. v. Symbiont Software
Group, Inc., 837 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the contract between the
parties did not bar a negligent security claim regarding customer financial information breaches by a
point-of-sale software manufacturer).
90. Just as with any negligence claim, a plaintiff in an information security negligence claim must
show that (1) a duty existed on the part of the defendant to keep data secure in accordance with a
specific standard of conduct in order to protect the plaintiff against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2)
the defendant breached this duty of data security; (3) this breach was the cause of the plaintiff's injury;
and (4) the plaintiff suffered quantifiable damages because of the data security breach.
91. In reTJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 2007).
92. Id. at 86 (citing Joseph Pereira, Breaking the Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out the
Wireless Door, In Biggest Known Theft, Retailer's Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 2007).
93. Consol. Class Action Compl. T44, In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., Docket No. 07-
10162-WGY (D. Mass. May 9, 2007).
94. Compare Ross Kerber, Analysts: TJX Case May Cost Over $b-Insurance, Tax Credits
Could Trim Expenses for Framingham Firm, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.boston.com/
business/personalfinance/articles/2007/04/12/analysts tjxscasemay cost over_ b/?page=2 with
Sharon Gaudin, Estimates Put TJ. Maxx Security Fiasco At $4.5 Billion, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 2,
2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=199203277.
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data handling were filed following the breach. 95 Although most of these• • • 96 •.
types of claims will likely settle, claims by banks and other larger entities
that incur losses as a result of breaches will likely continue to be litigated.
97
Therefore, in the TJX case, in addition to TJX's direct losses from the data
breach, the company would also incur the costs of settlement payouts and,
potentially, damage awards from remaining litigation. According to TJX's
estimates, it would cost the company more than $150 million to correct its
security problems and settle with consumers that were impacted by the
breach.
98
III. THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INFORMATION AND VULNERABILITY
The difficulty in addressing the problems of information vulnerability
arises, in part, from the fact that data vulnerability is driven by social
context and emergent structures. Dynamic interactions of multiple actors
have resulted in aggregate behaviors and norms that have shaped the nature
of the current data security policy dilemma. Blending the insights from
many disciplines, our policies must be flexible enough to absorb the
emerging strategic behavioral responses of corporations, criminals, and
consumers. First and foremost, our analytical models must be reframed
around an interdisciplinary policy-driven and problem-driven inquiry,
rather than a strictly legal or technological one.
Thus, the broader goal of this symposium is to advance the generation
of an international and interdisciplinary discourse on issues relating to
information security. The contributors on this issue span multiple
disciplines and countries. Each author approaches the policy problem of
information vulnerability from a different perspective, yet all of them agree
on the need of an interdisciplinary analysis.
The pieces are organized in three thematic sections. The first section
presents a conceptual introductory framework, followed by a practical
survey of the current state of information security problems in the United
States. The second section introduces the inherent duality of digital data as,
95. See, e.g., Compl. 9 1, 20-28, Wood v. TJX, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00147-RDP (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19,
2007); Compl. 99 1, 22-28, Miranda v. TJX, Inc., No. 07-cv-01075 (D. P.R. Jan. 26, 2007); Compl.
1-2, 20-29, Tennent v. TJX Cos, Inc., No. 07 cv 0484 WQH (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Compl. 99 6-
16, 26-32, Robinson v. TJX Cos, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-02139 (N.D. 11. Apr. 17, 2007).
96. See, e.g., Robert Vamosi, TJX Agrees to Settlement in Class Action Suits, CNET NEWS, Sept.
25, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9784465-7.html.
97. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Banks Hit T.J. Maxx Owner With Class-Action Lawsuit,
INFORMATION WEEK, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=199201456.
98. See, e.g., Robert Lemos, TJX Agrees to Class-Action Settlement, SECURITYFOCUS, Sept. 24,
2007, http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/594.
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simultaneously, property of the corporations and living persons; the section
then discusses corporate information security as a means of protecting both
intellectual property and personal data of individual citizens. The third
section discusses information security obligations under current United
States law and under possible future regulations.
A. Introduction to Information Security as a Policy Issue
Philip Howard and Kris Erickson introduce the practical challenges of
addressing information security as a policy matter. Philip Howard, a
professor of cyber culture studies in the Department of Communication at
the University of Washington, in joint work with Kris Erickson from the
Department of Geography at the University of Washington, sets forth the
empirical reality about the prevalence of information security breaches and
data leakage in both the corporate and the public sectors. Data breaches
between 1995 and 2006 demonstrate the vulnerability trends. During this
time, government agencies, firms, hospitals, universities, and the military
reported approximately 1.9 billion records as compromised due to the
information criminals hacking into systems and organizations mismanaging
information security. The escalating frequency and severity of breaches
presents an empirical case for addressing information security issues head-
on as a policy matter. Computer hacking has been widely blamed as the
primary cause of information vulnerability, obfuscating other contributing
causes of the problem. Similarly, Howard and Erickson argue that the
responsibility of commercial, educational, government, medical, and
military organizations for data security breaches has been erroneously
downplayed. The scale and scope of information loss over the past decade
would suggest that organizational self-regulation or self-monitoring is
failing.
B. Information Security and the Dual Nature of Consumer Data Held by
Corporations
Section two introduces key questions of intellectual property that
impact information security. An inherent duality exists in personally
identifiable information collected by corporations and governments. The
collector acquires an interest in the collected data, which becomes the
collector's intangible asset, while the consumers retain residual dignitary or
property interest in the same data. Some consumers, particularly children,
may require additional legislative protection of their interests in this data.
Although companies and governments struggle to protect their intellectual
property assets against attacks, sometimes, they may do so at the expense
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of other social interests.
1. Information Security and Consumer Data as a Corporate Intangible
Asset
Elizabeth Rowe, Greg Vetter and Peter Yu discuss various aspects of
the intersection of intellectual property law and data security, specifically
raising questions regarding the level of understanding that the corporations
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have of the
impact of intellectual property law on information security.
Professor Elizabeth Rowe from the University of Florida School of
Law discusses the risks of trade secret loss that companies face if they have
weak information security. Through a series of examples of companies that
have lost trade secret protection of their key assets, she warns of the danger
from rogue insiders because employees present the greatest threat to
information security that entities face today.
Professor Greg Vetter from the University of Houston School of Law
describes the patentability of cryptographic methodology and its
implications. He notes a significant increase in the number of cryptography
patents and discusses this increase in the broader historical context of
technology patents. Professor Vetter argues that pooling and building
portfolios can enable a race to the patent, which can crowd the prior art
with the positive and negative effects. Although he says that there is no
magic solution to this problem, the evolution of these mechanisms signals
possible self-ordering in clearing the patent thicket and license rights that
would allow cryptographic technology to move forward in a uniform and
standardized way.
Professor Peter Yu from Drake University School of Law presents the
international dimensions of intellectual property and information security
law. He explains the international political and economic dynamics of
information flow and argues that businesses have engaged in regulatory
arbitrage by relocating their operations to jurisdictions with more favorable
legal environments. To attract foreign investment and retain local
businesses, countries now actively participate in a race to the top or the
bottom. But, Professor Yu argues, it is important to remember that the
reform efforts needed for either race often incur significant costs. By
adopting an intellectual property system that ignores the balance between
access and protection, countries will ultimately harm their economies by
introducing laws that are not tailored to their interest, goals, and local
conditions.
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2. Information Security and Consumer Data as an Extension of the
Individual
Professor Gus Hosein of the London School of Economics cautions us
to remain conscious of both pragmatic and principle-based rationales for
information security rules. Using an example of the identity card debate in
the United Kingdom, he argues in favor of a governmental information
security approach that is sensitive to civil liberties. Professor Hosein warns
against a balancing test that places security in parity with civil liberties and,
therefore, erroneously allows pragmatism to triumph over principle.
C. The Future of Information Security Regulation
Section three addresses two aspects of the future of information
security regulation: the development of a common set of corporate
information security best practices and the development of workable
consumer protection regimes in connection with information security and
privacy interests.
1. Establishing Best Practices in Corporate Information Security
Kevin Cronin and Michael Siebecker familiarize us with corporate
duties relating to information security and the state of information security
litigation in regulatory and technological contexts. They also predict future
directions for the development of both the programming code and the law
on an international level.
Kevin Cronin, a practicing attorney who has represented clients in
data security breach matters before the FTC, presents an overview of the
current statutory regime and case law on corporate data care obligations.
He cautions that corporate data security cannot exist as an absolute state of
impenetrability; rather it is a process of combating internal and external
threats on a constant basis. Cronin explains the state of the art in
information security case law and discusses possible future legal trends.
Professor Michael Siebecker, an associate professor at the University
of Florida Law School, analyzes the role of securities law in connection
with the duties of publicly traded companies with regard to information
control. Siebecker argues that although the flexibility of evolving common
law may be attractive in some contexts, such as Internet regulation, the
jurisprudential and practical problems may outweigh the benefits of giving
the judges primary responsibility in defining the proper scope of internal
data control. Thus, Siebecker asserts that exempting certain small public
companies from the certification and audit requirements under Section 404
[Vol 84:3
DATA DEVOLUTION
of SOX is illogical.
2. Building Future Information Security Legal Regimes
Jay Kesan, Jennifer Chandler, Deborah Pierce and Lilian Edwards
suggest novel legal approaches to both information security and creation of
adequate recourse for individuals and corporations harmed by data
breaches. The approaches to re-conceptualization of the balance between
legal code and computer code, they argue, may be based on contracts, the
Constitution, or involve corporate self-help.
Professor Jay Kesan from the University of Illinois College of Law, in
joint work with Ruperto Majuca of the University of Illinois Department of
Economics, argue in favor of legal rules that allow "hacking [data] back" in
certain business circumstances. They analyze the strategic interaction
between the hacker and the attacked company or individual and conclude
that neither total prohibition nor unrestrained permission of hack-back is
optimal. Instead, they argue that when other alternatives are ineffective,
self-defense is the best response to cybercrime because there is a high
likelihood of correctly attacking the criminal, and the mitigation of
damages to the hacked victim's systems may outweigh the potential
damages to third parties during the hack-back.
Professor Jennifer Chandler from the University of Ottawa School of
Law discusses the possibility of contracting around obligations of data
security. She views security as a public good that is suffering from a free
rider problem. She notes that people tend to consent to contractual terms
that impose costs elsewhere. Consistent with this trend, computer owners
frequently consent to the terms that impose costs on third parties or the
public interest. Professor Chandler argues that to discourage parties from
including such terms into contracts, courts should refuse to enforce the
terms that externalize security costs.
Deborah Pierce, the executive director of PrivacyActivism, advocates
for a Constitutional amendment protecting privacy. She argues that the
privacy amendment should protect three types of dignitary interests: (1)
dignitary interests with regard to governmentally issued identity documents
and private tracking of our activities; (2) individual security and autonomy
interests with regard to reproductive rights; and (3) security interest in
personal information that affects our ability to act in a self-deterministic
way and to defend ourselves against identity theft. For Pierce, privacy
should be conceptualized as a fundamental human fight that is a necessary
component of our notion of liberty: a right that we should be able to assert
against both governments and private organizations.
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Finally, Professor Lilian Edwards from the University of Sheffield
School of Law explores the broader relationship between code based and
law based solutions in the context of information security policy. For
Professor Edwards, code trumps law: code is generally more effective than
regulation at addressing legal or psychological problems. And although the
privacy advocate community has been hostile to trusting a computer, she
argues that it does not necessarily have to be that way. According to
Professor Edwards, some actor in the system needs to have a supervisory
role in protecting privacy interests. One way to approach this challenge is
to build privacy values into the next generation of trusted computing and
have them enforce themselves through code.
In conclusion, these essays strive to create an understandable
interdisciplinary voice for the information security debate, bringing
together a diverse group of experts to think through ways to improve
information security. We hope these thoughts in the nascent legal field of
information security and commercial privacy regulation will spur legal
conversation, corporate reflection, consumer awareness, and regulatory
thoughtfulness in crafting future standards and recourse for harm associated
with information security breaches and information crime.
Most importantly, we hope to draw attention to the current critical
issues of information vulnerability in our society. Without addressing the
issues of information security aggressively and immediately, we risk the
viability of our economy, the stability of our markets, and the loss of
control over our critical infrastructure systems.
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